Protection from Induced Space Environments Effects on the International Space Station by Huang, Alvin et al.
PROTECTION FROM INDUCED SPACE ENVIRONMENTS EFFECTS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
Carlos Soares (1), Ron Mikatarian(2), Courtney Steagall(3), Danny Schmidl(4), Alvin Huang(5), Randy Olsen(6),
Steven Koontz(7), John Alred(8)
(1) The
 Boeing Company, 13100 Space Center Blvd., Houston, TX 77059, U.S.A., carlos.e.soares@boeing.com
(2)The Boeing Company, 13100 Space Center Blvd., Houston, TX 77059, U.S.A., ronald.r.mikatarian@boeing.com
(3)The Boeing Company, 13100 Space Center Blvd., Houston, TX 77059, U.S.A., courtney.a.steagall@boeing.com
(4)The Boeing Company, 13100 Space Center Blvd., Houston, TX 77059, U.S.A., william.d.schmidl@boeing.com
(5)The Boeing Company, 13100 Space Center Blvd., Houston, TX 77059, U.S.A., alvin.y.huang@boeing.com
(6)The Boeing Company, 13100 Space Center Blvd., Houston, TX 77059, U.S.A., randy.l.olsen@boeing.com(7)NASA JSC, ES4, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston, TX 77058, U.S.A, Email: steven.l.koontz@nasa.gov
(8)NASA JSC, ES4, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston, TX 77058, U.S.A, Email: john.w.alred@nasa.gov
ABSTRACT
The International Space Station (ISS) is the one of
largest, most complex multinational scientific project in
history and protection from induced space environments
effects is critical to its long duration mission as well as
to the health of the vehicle and safety of on-orbit
operations. This paper discusses some of the unique
challenges that were encountered during the design,
assembly and operation of the ISS and how they were
resolved. Examples are provided to illustrate the issues
and the risk mitigation strategies that were developed to
resolve these issues. Of particular importance are issues
related with the interaction of multiple spacecraft as in
the case of ISS and Visiting Vehicles transporting crew,
hardware elements, cargo and scientific payloads. These
strategies are applicable to the development of future
long duration space systems, not only during design, but
also during assembly and operation of these systems.
1. ISS INDUCED ENVIRONMENTS
During a typical year of ISS operations, induced
environments are produced with thruster operations
(reboost and attitude control, and proximity operations
of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and Russian, European and
Japanese Visiting Vehicles), and operation of vacuum
vents, which vent a variety of gases and in some cases
liquids to space.
Analyses are conducted to assess induced environments
effects on vehicle systems and assets. Analysis results
are used to develop risk mitigation and safing
constraints to protect the ISS and its science utilization
capabilities.
2. THRUSTER OPERATIONS
The bipropellant thrusters used by ISS (for reboost and
attitude control), Space Shuttle and other Visiting
Vehicles produce contamination and mechanical erosion
on exposed surfaces which can impact optical properties
and performance of systems such as the ISS solar arrays
and robotic cameras, as well as introduce hazards to
Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA).
During ISS operations, a variety of rocket engines are
used by the Space Station and its visiting vehicles
(Space Shuttle Orbiter, Soyuz, Progress, etc.) for
attitude control, orbit reboost, and docking/undocking.
These various engines are bipropellant thrusters using
hypergolic components, either monomethyl hydrazine
(MMH) or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH)
as the fuel and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4, or NTO) as
the oxidizer. The exhaust plumes from these engines
have been recognized as a potential source of loads,
heating, and contamination.
Laboratory studies have revealed the presence of
unburned propellant in the exhaust plume in the form of
liquid particles. The origin of the particles, which can
range from 1 to 100µm in diameter, is commonly
attributed to incomplete combustion. The gases in the
exhaust plume accelerate these propellant particles, or
frozen drops, to high velocities (1–3 km/s) due to gas
drag forces. The effect of these high-velocity particles
impacting onto sensitive ISS surfaces, such as the solar
arrays and active radiators, is akin to the impact of
micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MM/OD) particles.
The flux of particles in thruster plumes, however, is
much larger than the flux of MM/OD particles of
comparable diameter.
The thruster plume particle flux is based on a semi-
empirical model for the plume centerline of a Space
Shuttle Orbiter primary reaction control system thruster.
Given the comparably high flux of thruster plume
particles, the plume erosion/ pitting effect is of great
concern to the ISS program.
Three space-flight experiments, which studied exhaust
plume induced contamination, were the shuttle plume
impingement experiment on STS-52, the shuttle plume
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impingement flight experiment (SPIFEX) on STS-64,
and the plume impingement contamination experiment
(PIC) on STS-74 (a mission to the Mir space station),
which studied plume contamination from both
American and Russian thrusters. Both SPIFEX and PIC
demonstrated pitting from plume particles. 1, 2
A SPIFEX aluminum witness coupon, which was
plumed by the space shuttle reaction control system
thrusters, is shown in Fig. 1. The figure shows plume
particle pits in the range of 1–10µm, though pits as large
as 40µmhave been observed. A post-flight examination
of a glass camera lens on the PIC experiment also
revealed impact craters on the surface.6 An example of
these impact craters is shown in Fig. 4; this crater has a
diameter of approximately 8 µm. It should be noted that
the craters on the SPIFEX and PIC samples were not
visible with the unaided eye. Surface pits were observed
with a scanning electron microscope.
Figure 1. Plume particle impact features on SPIFEX
witness aluminium coupon
3. PROTECTION FROM THRUSTER
OPERATIONS
For many optically sensitive surfaces, special coatings
are applied to enhance performance or for
environmental protection. For sensitive ISS surfaces,
mechanical damage from thruster plume particle
impacts has significant implications. Optically sensitive
surfaces on the ISS can be damaged (or eroded) when
impacted by high-velocity droplets/particles from
unburned and partially burned liquid propellant present
in bipropellant thruster plumes.
Sensitive surfaces that may see a great number of
thruster firings during ISS operations include the ISS
photovoltaic (PV) solar arrays, the active thermal
control system (ATCS) radiators and robotic cameras on
the Space Station Remote Manipulator System
(SSRMS) and truss mounted cameras. Fig. 2 identifies
ISS solar arrays and active thermal system radiator
surfaces for the 15A assembly stage.
Figure 2. Select ISS sensitive surfaces for the 15A
assembly stage
Plume contamination models were developed to support
the definition of position and orientation of solar array
panels during specific thruster operations. These
constraints protect the performance of the ISS electrical
power system which is vital to both vehicle and science
operations.
3.1. ISS Solar Arrays
Surfaces with thin optical coatings, such as solar arrays
and radiators, are of primary concern. Thruster plume
induced erosion of sensitive surfaces has been observed
on Space Shuttle flight experiments.
The Boeing Space Environments Team in Houston
developed an approach to modeling thruster plume-
induced erosion of ISS surface materials. The Boeing
team conducted analyses simulating bipropellant
thruster particles impacting sensitive ISS surfaces for
various assembly stages. Thruster firings for ISS
reboost/attitude control, as well as visiting vehicle
thruster firings during approach or separation to ISS
docking ports, were simulated.
The results of these analyses show that particle
impingement angle greatly affects surface damage, with
normal impacts being the most severe. Particles with
highly oblique impact angles ( ^-75° off-normal),
however, will essentially skid off surfaces without
producing any damage. 3
A mitigation technique was developed to prevent plume
erosion of solar array coatings. Before a thruster-firing
event, solar arrays may be rotated to a pre-established
position that will eliminate plume particle impact
damage to the surface. The pre-established positions are
defined based on the geometry of the ISS thrusters
relative to the solar array panels to ensure that plume
particles will impinge at highly oblique angles (greater
than 75° off-normal).
Operational constraints for plume erosion mitigation are
coordinated with other solar array operational
constraints such as power, thermal, and plume-induced
structural loads. An integrated operational solution has
been implemented to support the ISS assembly flight
sequence.
The Boeing Space Environments Team was tasked to
determine the positions to which the solar arrays could
rotate so that thruster plume erosion would be minimal.
Based on previous analyses that showed that particle
impacts at angles greater than 75° to normal produced
no damage, the following mitigation conditions were
initially derived: 1) the solar array must be rotated so
that the plume impingement angle to a solar array
surface is greater than 75° from the normal, and 2) no
thruster plume is allowed to contact the active side of
the solar array.
These criteria alone were found, in some cases, to be
difficult or impossible to execute operationally.
Therefore, an alternative criterion was added to allow
more operational flexibility: Solar array positions that
induced no greater than 1% surface area damage per
year are considered acceptable. This criterion is largely
a function of the solar array’s position from the
centerline of the thruster plume, because the majority of
plume particles are located near the plume centerline.
Typically, a solar array positioned 30 to 40° from a
plume centerline (or farther) would be nearly free of
plume particle impact damage.
In several ISS configurations, the U.S. solar arrays have
two degrees of rotational freedom: about the ISS truss
(•) and about the solar array wing centerline (• ). If the
solar array • joint could be rotated away from the plume
centerline (to meet the alternative criterion), the • could
be rotated freely to optimize view to the sun. Otherwise,
both the solar array • and • rotations must be fixed, or
“feathered,” to mitigate plume erosion (per the first
criterion set).
The implemented mitigation strategy successfully
protects the solar arrays from plume induced damage
while optimizing the solar arrays’ view to the sun.
The thruster induced erosion events of concern for ISS
solar arrays include Progress on DC1 nadir thruster
firings for ISS roll control, orbiter thruster firings during
approach and separation to PMA2, and orbiter thruster
firings during mated ISS operations. Feathering angles
to mitigate plume erosion must be defined for each of
these thruster firing events.
For Progress on DC1 nadir roll control firings,
allowable solar array • /• angle pairs to mitigate erosion
were defined per the mitigation criteria. These • /• pairs
have been tabulated for inclusion into a flight rule to
provide flight controllers with the proper settings to
ensure solar array protection. A sample table is shown
for the P4 solar array in Fig. 3. It should be noted that
allowable solar array • /• angle pairs are shown in gray.
Figure 3. P4-2A allowable feathering angles for
Progress on DC1 nadir roll control thruster firings
Proximity operations have another factor adding
complexity to plume erosion mitigation. Solar arrays
may need to be positioned to minimize plume erosion
from the incoming (or departing) vehicle’s thruster
firings. In addition, ISS thrusters fire to maintain ISS
attitude during proximity operations. Consequently,
solar arrays must be positioned to mitigate plume
erosion from both the visiting vehicle and the ISS
thruster firings for attitude control. Orbiter proximity
operations provide a good example of this scenario.
Typically, the Progress docked to SM aft will perform
ISS pitch and yaw control and the Progress docked to
DC1 nadir will perform ISS roll control during orbiter
approach and separation. The solar array position must
protect against all thruster firings from these vehicles.
Analyses were conducted to determine the allowable
solar array • /• angle pairs that mitigate plume erosion
during orbiter proximity operations (with Progress on
SM aft and Progress on DC1 nadir performing ISS
attitude control). These • /• pairs have been tabulated for
inclusion into a flight rule to provide flight controllers
with the proper settings to assure solar array protection.
An example of this table is shown for the P4 solar array
in Fig. 4. By comparison to Fig. 3 (the • /• pairs that
mitigate plume erosion from Progress on DC1 nadir
alone), it is evident that the added element of orbiter
thruster firings severely limits allowable solar array
positions.
robotic cameras from incursions into regions with
potentially high erosion fluxes.
An erosion plane plot for a Russian vehicle approach to
the ISS MRM1 nadir docking port in shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 4. P4-2A allowable feathering angles for Orbiter
approach to ISS (with Progress on SM aft and Progress
on DC1 nadir attitude control)
As the Boeing ISS Environments Team completes
plume erosion analyses for ISS thrusters pluming solar
arrays, results must be incorporated into ISS program
flight rules. The tabulated • /• combinations for
allowable solar array positions are prepared for various
thruster firing events (Figs. 3 and 4). Before the
feathering angle tables can be implemented into flight
rules, plume erosion results must be integrated with all
other applicable ISS requirements.
These requirements may include feathering solar arrays
to minimize thruster plume-induced structural loads or
heating. Power requirements may also be a driver in
determining where solar arrays may be positioned. An
integrated solution must be found including all
subsystem requirements; this solution then moves
forward into the flight rules. Flight controllers use the
proper solar array settings defined in flight rules to
ensure systemwide performance during thruster firing
events.
3.2. ISS Cameras
ISS robotic arm camera assets, which are essential to the
vehicle, are also protected from thruster induced erosion
and contamination through modeling and development
of Keep-Out Zones (KOZs) for camera operations.
Simulations of visiting vehicle approach to and
separation from ISS are used in the development of
erosion planes (contour plots) that are used in the
definition of KOZs for ISS robotic camera assets. These
KOZs are used to protect SSRMS and truss mounted
Figure 5. Erosion plane plot for Russian Vehicle
approach to the ISS MRM1 nadir docking port
This strategy has been proven to be successful as
robotic camera assets continue to operate without
degradation from erosion effects while being used to
monitor approach of automated vehicles to ISS
3.3. EVA Hazards from Plume Contamination
Thruster induced contamination also produces hazards
to extra-vehicular activity (EVA) as the fuel/oxidizer
reaction products contain toxic byproducts
(Fuel/Oxidizer Reaction Products or FORP). The Space
Environments Team coordinated FORP testing at the
NASA White Sands Test Facility in conjunction with
coordination with Russia to develop hazard mitigation
through Flight Rules defining EVA crew keep-out
zones. 4
The U.S. control moment gyros (CMGs) maintain the
vehicle attitude of the International Space Station (ISS)
by compensating for disturbances. However, when the
docking compartment (DC1) of the ISS, the location of
the Russian airlock, is depressurized for extravehicular
activities (EVAs), the service module (SM) attitude
control thrusters have to fire because the CMGs have an
insufficient margin of momentum to compensate for the
disturbance and must be desaturated.
The ISS propellant is unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine
(UDMH), and the oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide (N 2O4).
Thruster firings produce fuel–oxidizer reaction products
(FORP) that can contaminate adjacent surfaces around
the thrusters. For EVAs on the aft end of the SM of the
Russian segment, there is a concern that when EVA
crewmembers translate around the FORP-contaminated
area they could inadvertently brush against the FORP
and transfer some of it to their suits.
FORP is composed of both volatile and non-volatile
components. How fast the volatile components leave
varies. One of the components present in FORP that
represents the greatest toxicological concern to the crew
is the potent carcinogen N-nitrosodimethylamine
(NDMA). NDMA is volatile; it poses an inhalation
concern if it is introduced into the ISS atmosphere. In
addition, when other components in the dried FORP,
such as dimethylammonium nitrite and nitrate, are
reintroduced into a humid environment such as the ISS
cabin, NDMA can be formed. So the concern is that
when FORP (on the suit) is brought back into the humid
environment of the ISS cabin, it can release NDMA into
the atmosphere and the crew can be exposed.
Because of the presence of FORP on the SM surfaces
adjacent to the roll thrusters and the potential for FORP
contamination of the EVA crew, additional EVA
constraints were required to be implemented in these
areas. The constraints were initially established through
a nonconformance report that discussed the removal of
the Kromka 1-0 experiment and installation of the
Kromka 1-1 experiment and in subsequent ISS program
safety review panel discussions.
The EVA constraints were initially developed because
the Kromka experiment is in close proximity to the SM
thrusters, and the EVA crewmembers would need to
enter that area. The constraints included establishing a
1-m keep-out zone (KOZ) around the thrusters for 2.5 h
after the last SM thrusters fired before the EVA
crewmembers could enter the area, procedures for
inspecting the EVA suits before ingress back into the
airlock, and procedures for wiping the gloves and suit
with towels that are jettisoned to retrograde. Also, once
inside the ISS, the EVA gloves are bagged to mitigate
any potential risk from FORP. Because EVAs are
generally very time-constrained, the ISS program
approved a test program at the NASA White Sands Test
Facility (WSTF) to obtain FORP test data that could be
used to determine whether those EVA constraints could
be relaxed.
Owing to the presence of FORP on the SM surfaces
adjacent to the roll thrusters observed in Flight 5A and
subsequent imaging and the potential for FORP
contamination of the EVA crew, additional EVA
constraints were required to be implemented in those
areas. These EVA constraints were initially
implemented through the non-conformance report
described earlier. The constraints included establishing
a 1-m keep-out zone (KOZ) around the thrusters for a
period of time after the last SM thrusters fired before the
EVA crewmembers could enter the area, procedures for
inspecting the EVA suits before ingress back into the
airlock, and procedures for wiping the gloves and suit
with towels that are jettisoned to retrograde. Also, once
inside the ISS, the EVA gloves are bagged to mitigate
any potential risk from FORP.
Prior to an EVA on the Russian segment, the DC1 must
be depressurized, because it is used as an airlock. When
the DC1 is depressurized, the CMGs’ margin of
momentum is insufficient to compensate for the
disturbance and the service module attitude control
thrusters need to fire to desaturate the CMGs. The
thruster firings result in FORP contamination of the
adjacent SM surfaces.
The FORP contamination of the SM surfaces, the
release of NDMA in a humid environment from crew
EVA suits if they happen to be contaminated with
FORP, and the toxicological risk associated with the
NDMA release were calculated. It was determined that
the FORP and NDMA evaporate rapidly and that their
concentration drops off rapidly with distance from the
thrusters. The FORP remaining after 1 h for the nadir
(cold side) case was found to be 36% of the initial mass.
For the zenith (hot side) case the FORP remaining after
1 h was 22% of the initial mass.
The NASA JSC Toxicology Group found that the
highest calculated cancer risk from the projected
NDMA concentrations is less than 8.46E −5 (−40 qC,q q a# q q
distance 0.08 m from the thrusters). The NASA JSC
Toxicology Group, with the concurrence of the National
Research Council Spacecraft Maximum Allowable
Concentrations (SMAC) Subcommittee, accepts a
cancer risk of 1/10,000 (i.e., 1.0E −4) in deriving
SMACs on carcinogenic compounds, such as benzene.
Based on the results of tests performed in 2003 and
2004, subsequent analyses, and the NASA JSC
Toxicology Group assessment of the risk, it was
determined that the constraints could be reduced and the
time to remain outside the 1-m KOZ could be reduced
to 1 h. The procedures for inspecting the EVA suits and
clean-up procedures were retained. The reduction in




Potential degradation of thermo-optical properties of
vehicle systems is carefully evaluated as system failures
leading to unplanned EVA R&R are viewed as
hazardous. The combined effect of induced
contamination and exposure to space environments is
modeled and assessed for impacts. Correlations derived
from degradation predictions and observed thermal
performance have been conducted to assess model
applicability. These activities mitigate the risk of
system failures due to optical property degradation.
Hardware lifetime is highly dependent on optical
properties, which may degrade over time due to space
environment effects. Induced effects which can degrade
optical properties include molecular deposition due to
outgassing and water vent/thruster plume contaminant
deposition and erosion. Degradation of optical
properties affects the thermal performance and can
result in hardware becoming hotter or colder than it was
designed for. It can also limit the attitudes that the
vehicle can fly or require hardware to be replaced
sooner than planned. In some cases, hardware lifetime
can actually be extended with improved predictive
capability for optical property degradation.
The Boeing ISS Space Environments team has
developed and refined models of optical property
degradation induced by molecular contamination (i.e.
deposition due to material outgassing, venting
operations, and thruster firings) as well as exposure to
the on-orbit environment. For ISS thermal control
surfaces, the models incorporate: molecular
contamination effects (actual contaminant deposition
predictions vs. design requirements), temporal effects
due to solar exposure, and the operational end-of-life
assessment.
Several thermal analyses were performed with this
model (using as-flown contamination predictions and
solar exposure estimates) and yielded lower solar
absorptivity degradation predictions. Such results imply
enhanced thermal capability and therefore
reduced/eliminated thermal constraints for some ISS
components. These analyses assumed realistic ESH
values calculated by the ISS Passive Thermal Control
System (PTCS) team using as-flown and future
expected attitudes and durations.
For example, the radiators for the Node1 heat pipe were
originally predicted to have a lifetime of 3 years in the
nominal ISS attitude. Larger 13-year life radiators were
planned as a replacement. By re-examining the original
analysis using improved modeling of optical property
degradation combined with planned flight
attitude/durations, it was determined that the original
radiators life could be extended by several years with
some attitude constraints as documented in the Flight
Rules. This gave the ISS Program more flexibility on
the replacement of the PMA1 MDM radiators.
5. VACUUM VENTING
During a typical year, induced environments are
produced with the operation of 33 active vacuum vents,
which vent a variety of gases, and in some cases liquids,
to space.
Vacuum venting of liquid water from the Space Shuttle
while mated to ISS, and as required from the U.S. Lab
module can produce an orbital recontact hazard since
the venting produces a large flux of ice particles that can
recontact ISS every half-orbit. The risk of recontact is
mitigated through control of vehicle attitude to prevent
orbital recontact with ice particles.
5.1. Water dumps
The International Space Station (ISS) and Orbiter dump
water overboard into space. The phenomena of water
release into a vacuum have been studied for many years.
It is known that as the liquid exits the nozzle into the
vacuum of space it begins to freeze by radiative and
evaporative cooling. It freezes initially on the outer
surface of the stream. Then expanding gas bubbles in
the stream burst the stream into vapor and small and
large liquid/ice particles that can travel in various
directions.
When water is dumped overboard, the concern is that
direct contact of the liquid/ice particles with ISS
hardware can cause mechanical damage to sensitive
surfaces due to erosion/pitting of those surfaces. Solar
arrays are of particular concern because of the thin
optical coatings on the surfaces of the solar cells.
Damage to these coatings can cause degradation of the
solar cells’ optical characteristics that can potentially
reduce performance and shorten the life of the solar
cells.
To mitigate potential damage from water dumps, a
methodology was developed that could be used to
develop the constraints needed to protect sensitive ISS
surfaces. To develop the methodology, the
characteristics of water dumps were studied and the
select angles at which the ISS solar arrays can be parked
to preclude damage to solar array and radiator surfaces
were defined. The select angles were used to develop
the constraints needed to mitigate damage. 5
Operational constraints needed to mitigate damage from
liquid/ice particle impacts were developed based on
analysis results from Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics
(SPH) impact simulations. Although the results did not
show any damage to the solar cell, the ultraviolet energy
(UVE) protective coating is thin, 43,300 Å. If the
coating is damaged it could potentially degrade the
performance and lifetime of the solar cell. To be
conservative, it was determined that the operational
constraint will be not to allow impacts onto the active
side of the solar arrays.
The backside of the solar array has a 1300Å SiOx
coating to protect the Kapton backing from atomic
oxygen erosion. Below the Kapton layer, there are
additional layers that, if eroded, will not affect the
performance of the solar cell. However, to minimize
damage to the solar array, the operational constraint
developed for the backside of the solar array is that
impacts will be at a shallow angle, less than 15 deg to
the surface (or 75 deg from the surface normal).
In addition, to minimize the number of impacts, an
operational constraint was developed so that the solar
arrays will be rotated to remain outside the impact zone
with engineering margin (the 20° half-cone angle cone
around the plume centerline). To mitigate damage to the
solar array photovoltaic radiators, an operational
constraint was developed to keep the radiators away
from the plume centerline. The radiators operate cold
and cannot be feathered. In addition, the effect of
liquid/ice particle impacts on the radiators has not been
well defined yet. The constraint is to keep a solar array
between the impact zone with engineering margin and
the radiator. This operational constraint will allow the
radiators no closer than 50–60° from the plume
centerline.
5.2. U.S. Lab water dump damage mitigation and
operational constraints
Figure 6 shows the field of view from the port-side U.S.
Lab condensate water nozzle for ISS assembly
complete. The solar arrays are rotated outside of the
impact zone with engineering margin and feathered so
that impacts from the water dump occur on the backside
of the arrays. The Japanese hardware can be seen in the
lower right section of the view. This view can be
compared with the one shown in Fig. 5a, where the solar
array would be impacted.
Figure 6. Field-of-view from port-side U.S. Lab
condensate water dump nozzle. The solar array is
feathered and rotated out of the impact zone with
engineering margin.
An example of the allowable feathering angles that will
feather the solar array wings (SAWs) so that impacts
from the liquid/ice particles occur on the backside of the
arrays at a shallow angle is shown in Fig. 7. This table
was developed based on the defined constraints. This
table gives allowable solar array • /• feathering angle
pair combinations that will mitigate damage from U.S.
Lab water port side nozzle dumps. The white region
represents the allowable SAW positions. In this table,
the port-side solar array rotary joint • rotations are
defined down the left-hand side of the table.
Figure 7. Example U.S. Lab port-side condensate water
dump allowable solar array feathering angles for the
P4-4A solar array wing (SAW)for• gimbal assembly • -
rotations from 0 to 238 deg. White zone is allowable
SAW positions.
The • gimbal assembly beta rotations from 0 to 114° are
defined along the top of the table. The remainder of the
• rotation angles, from 114 to 360°, is defined in
another table. Similar tables have been developed for
U.S. Lab starboard-side nozzle dumps and for orbiter
water dumps.
5.3. Orbiter water dump damage mitigation and
operational constraints
Figure 8 shows the field of view from the orbiter dump
nozzle for a solar array rotated out of the high-impact
zone and with the solar array feathered so that impacts
are on the backside of the array at a shallow angle. The
solar array is feathered so that there are no impacts on
the active side of the array and so that impacts on the
back of the array are at a shallow angle. This view can
be compared with the one shown in Fig. 9 where the
solar array would be impacted. The JAXA payload sites
can be seen just below the center of the plume. Urine
dumping was discontinued with the deployment of the
Japanese elements.
Figure 8. Field of view from orbiter water dump nozzle.
The solar array is feathered and rotated out of the
impact zone with engineering margin.
Allowable feathering angle • /• pair combinations
similar to those discussed earlier for the U.S. Lab
condensate water dumps have been developed for
orbiter water dumps and incorporated in table format.
This approach is used to develop the constraints needed
to mitigate damage to ISS hardware from the U.S. Lab
and orbiter water dumps. The results of these studies
show that the ISS solar arrays can be parked at select
angles during water dump operations that will protect
the solar array and radiator surfaces from impact
damage.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses some of the unique challenges that
were encountered during the design, assembly and
operation of the ISS and how successful mitigation
strategies were develop to protect the ISS from induced
environment effects. Solar arrays are of particular
concern because of the thin optical coatings on the
surfaces of the cells. Damage to these coatings can
cause degradation of the cells’ performance and
operational lifetime. Examples are provided to illustrate
the issues and the risk mitigation strategies that were
developed to resolve these issues. These strategies are
applicable to the development of future long duration
space systems, not only during design, but also during
assembly and operation of these systems.
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